

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 27 February 1964, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

(United States of America)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J. de CASTRO
Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. LUKANOV
Mr. G. GHELEV
Mr. D. TEHOV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

Mr. James BARRINGTON
U HTOON SHEIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. T. LAHODA
Mr. J. BUECK
Mr. V. VAJNAR

Ethiopia:

Ato Abate AGEDE
Ato S. TEFERRA

India:

Mr. R.K. NEHRU
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. Ernesto de SANTIAGO
Mr. Manuel TELLO
Miss Ofelia REYES RETANA

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI
Mr. J. GOLDBLAT
Mrs. H. CHLOND

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. M. IONESCU
Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD
Mr. C.G. EKLUND
Mr. J. PRAWITZ

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. M. KASSEM
Mr. S.E. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON
Mr. J.G. TAHOUDIN
Mr. A.J. WILLIAMS

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. A.L. RICHARDS
Mr. D.S. MacDONALD
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I declare open the one hundred and seventieth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. ZEMLA (Czechoslovakia): Before coming to today's business, Mr. Chairman, perhaps it would be better if you would be kind enough to inform us of the result of your meeting yesterday with your co-Chairman. I think it is the general feeling in our Committee that your report would be of great interest to all of us.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): It had been my intention to make an announcement on behalf of the co-Chairmen at the end of this meeting. However, if it is indeed the desire of members of the Committee that I make the report now, I shall be happy to do so. What is your pleasure? Are there others who would like to have it announced now?

Mr. NEHRU (India): I think that in this matter we should be guided by your discretion, Mr. Chairman, and by what you and your co-Chairman consider to be the most convenient arrangement. If you think that an announcement should be made at the end of today's discussion, I think we should all accept your decision and also the decision of your co-Chairman.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): As co-Chairman, I fully share the view of the United States co-Chairman, who has just told us that he will be happy to inform the Committee now of the results of the meeting between the co-Chairmen. That is how I understood you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): It would seem to me that there are at least two members of our Committee who would like the result of our discussions to be announced now. Since one of those two members is my co-Chairman, in deference to him I will say that I agree with him on this and I shall read out now what I had planned to read at the end of this meeting.

(The Chairman, United States)

In my capacity as one of the co-Chairmen, I met my Soviet colleague yesterday to discuss the presentation of collateral measures at our Thursday meetings. We discussed the agenda proposal of the representative of the United Arab Republic as well as other possibilities, and so far we have been unable to identify a topic or group of topics which in the view of both co-Chairmen offers sufficient prospect for early agreement to warrant being placed on an agenda to the exclusion of other topics. My delegation hopes that, as our plenary discussion of the various proposals unfolds, the two co-Chairmen and the Committee will be able to identify particular topics as holding promise for agreement. Does my co-Chairman care to add anything to that statement?

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to inform the members of the Committee that on the question of the order in which the so-called collateral or partial measures should be discussed there have already been, as the Committee knows, quite a number of meetings between the co-Chairmen. During these meetings, on our side -- that is, on the side of the Co-Chairman from the Soviet Union -- several possibilities were put forward which, in our opinion, could serve as a basis for agreement on the Committee's procedure of work. In particular, we suggested that the Committee should deal first of all with two questions. One of them, which we consider to be the most promising, is the question of the reduction of budgets; the other question, which the United States side considers to hold the most promise for agreement, is the question of the nondissemination of nuclear weapons.

Thus on our side it was suggested that the Committee should deal with these two questions on Thursdays. Moreover, we even suggested, in order to meet the wishes of the United States side, that these two questions should be considered alternately, so that there should be no prejudice to the interests of either side. We suggested that the question of military budgets should be discussed on the first Thursday, that on the following Thursday we could consider the question of the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, and so on until we conclude the discussion of these matters.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Unfortunately the United States side did not deem it possible to agree to that order; but it seems to us that it would perhaps be appropriate to discuss this aspect of the matter in the Committee, and that perhaps we should succeed collectively in convincing the United States side of the usefulness of introducing such an order into our discussions; because our general debate on Thursdays is already dragging on into the second month, and it seems to be high time to bring it to an end and to pass on to the specific consideration of individual questions. We think that such a time has come, and this question must be settled. Therefore it seems to me that we could discuss this aspect of the matter now, or, if not now, at some other time, depending on what other considerations are put forward. But it seems to us that it would be appropriate to do so straight away.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I shall take the privilege of the Chairman and respond to the remarks my co-Chairman has made. It is the belief of the United States that this Conference can best progress by attempting to find subjects on which it is possible to reach agreement. I have made it clear to the Conference (ENDC/PV.166, p.15) -- and I have made it clear to the other co-Chairman -- that the discussion of military budgets here in an attempt to arrive at a hortatory request for specific cuts in military budgets is not a useful procedure from the viewpoint of my country, in view of its constitutional methods of procedure. I have also stated on two occasions to this Committee that we welcome a reduction of military budgets in the cases of those countries where such is possible. We doubt that a discussion here, attempting to impose such reduction on countries where the conditions do not allow of it, would be useful. Therefore we have said that, in the view of the United States, it would be better to explore a number of subjects some of which are common to the list of President Johnson's five points (ENDC/120) and the memorandum of the Soviet Union (ENDC/123).

In the further exploration and development of some of those points it had seemed to us that it would be much more desirable to attempt to find subjects on which there was a chance of common development and acceptance. It is for that reason that we have been unwilling to agree at this time that a specific agenda on

(The Chairman, United States)

even the two points which have been suggested by my fellow co-Chairman would move us ahead as rapidly as would a further elaboration of some of the points which we believe are significant and which it is our intention to put **before** this Conference in the course of the next several weeks. Therefore, in the interests of what we believe would be a more expeditious arrival at agreements, we have been unwilling to recommend to this Conference that it devote its time to these particular subjects, either simultaneously or alternately.

Mr. HASSAN (United Arab Republic): Mr. Chairman, I should like to express to you and to our Soviet Union co-Chairman our thanks for your quick response to the appeal we made at our last meeting, when we called upon the two co-Chairmen to meet in order to find a way out of the impasse concerning the fixing of an agenda in connexion with collateral measures (ENDC/PV.169, pp.34, 36). While we express our gratification at the good will which emanated from the co-Chairmen in this regard, it seems that, much to our regret, they were unable to present an agreed agenda which could have enabled our Committee to embark on the discussion of the collateral measures in an orderly and fruitful way.

That is why, Mr. Chairman, we should like to revert to our proposal, mentioned at our last meeting, to hold now or in the very near future, if you wish, an informal meeting to deal with this urgent problem (*ibid.*, p.34). At such a meeting we might have a better chance than at our plenary meetings to arrive at an agreement; and we might have an opportunity to know much more about the difficulties -- which we really do not believe to exist.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): My delegation is among those which specially recommended the co-Chairmen to try to reach agreement on a concerted agenda. I should therefore like first of all to associate myself with the sentiments expressed by our colleague from the United Arab Republic, and thank the co-Chairmen for their repeated efforts to reach agreement on this question.

I ^{*}now cannot help wondering whether the time is really ripe for drawing up an agenda. I remember that at an earlier meeting the Soviet delegation stated

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

that its proposal for the reduction of military budgets had met with the support of the representatives of several of the non-aligned countries (ENDC/PV.168, p.17). I should like to point out that our proposal for freezing strategic nuclear missiles (ENDC/120) met with the warm support of most -- I was about to say all -- of the delegations of the non-aligned countries. I cannot quote offhand what those delegations said on the subject, but I could certainly do so at a later meeting. Accordingly, in my opinion, the question of freezing appears to be per se, by its nature and by the support it has received from the delegations of non-aligned countries, a question which is undoubtedly entitled to priority.

I think too that what you have just said, Mr. Chairman, has met with general support: that, in order to establish an order of priority, we should select topics on which agreement is almost in sight, or at least on which agreement is more likely and less difficult.

In this connexion, however, I should like to point out that the fourteen proposals for collateral measures which have been advanced **by either the** United States or the Soviet delegation have not been fully described by those delegations. Both the United States delegation and the Soviet delegation have developed some of these proposals, but not all. At the stage we have reached, I think it would be preferable for these two delegations, with the assistance of others, to continue the examination of the proposals they have made -- such an examination would, of course, be preliminary --; and, when this discussion has been concluded, the two co-Chairmen, taking into account the comments made by all the delegations on all the proposals advanced, should meet again in order -- as we hope -- to reach final agreement on a concerted agenda.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I wish only to say a few words on the procedural aspects of this problem. I find myself very broadly in agreement with what our colleague from Italy has just said. It seems to me that in normal committee work, when one is trying to find what the subjects for discussion should be, one relies upon what is called a "steering committee", whose business it is normally to prepare an agenda for the committee to discuss. In our Committee

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

that work of a steering committee has for a long period now devolved upon the two co-Chairmen sitting together and acting as a steering committee. It seems to me that it is only right that at a certain moment, if they have not succeeded in reaching agreement, they should report that fact to the Conference as a whole. But, if I may say so very respectfully, it seems to me that it is not right then to throw the whole matter open for discussion in the Conference in order to reach a consensus of the Conference -- if only because it is a long and time-consuming business and at the end of it one is very often no clearer than one was at the outset.

Therefore I should not feel that it was desirable to do what our Soviet colleague suggested: to try to reach a decision here in the Conference as a whole on what our agenda should be. I should warmly support what was proposed by Mr. Cavalletti: that we should take note with regret for the moment that we have no agenda; that that, on the other hand, does not absolve the co-Chairmen from their task of trying to steer us in the right direction; and that we should urge them to continue to meet at the appropriate moment and to attempt to draw up an agenda for us.

In the course of our normal discussions we shall each of us be expressing our views on the subjects which we think most important; and that in itself, coupled with the work of the two co-Chairmen behind the scenes, should in my view provide us with the best way of taking us out of any impasse in which we find ourselves at present.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland): First of all I should like to join our colleagues from the United Arab Republic and Italy in paying tribute to you, Mr. Chairman, and to our Soviet colleague for the attempts you have made to draft an agreed agenda. We regret that for the time being it has been impossible to do so. However, we believe the matter to be sufficiently important to be discussed in this forum, especially since we are all concerned. Here may I echo the words

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

of the leader of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Butler, who in this Committee the day before yesterday appealed to us to improve our procedure in order to make greater progress (ENDC/PV.169, pp. 16, 17)? It seems to me that the first thing we ought to do is to arrive at some sort of consensus about the matters we wish to discuss.

I have listened with great care to the statement which you yourself, Mr. Chairman, made at the beginning of our meeting today, when you reported on your talks with your co-Chairman. You mentioned that, in your view, we ought to take up those subjects offering the greatest prospects of agreement. That is also our opinion. However, we know from our own experience that it is very difficult, if not impossible, at least for the time being, to arrive at an agenda listing only those matters concerning which a commitment to discuss is equivalent to a commitment to agree; and I do not believe that we should be well advised to create the impression amongst the public at large that, because we have agreed to put such and such an item on the agenda, we believe the prospects of agreement to be very good. Therefore, while it is also our opinion that first priority should be given to the items offering the greatest prospects of agreement, I do not think we should be well advised to create impressions which might not accord entirely with reality.

The second observation which I should like to make also derives from your statement, Mr. Chairman. You said that you do not think we should be well advised to draft an agenda on which certain items would appear to the exclusion of all others. I do not think that, by drafting an agenda and putting certain items on it, we automatically exclude the discussion of other items -- at least, that is not our understanding of the procedure we ought to follow. If we favour the drafting of a specific agenda, it is because we believe that it is easier to discuss one item or two items than to discuss fourteen items at once. In my view, the proposal advanced by the representative of the Soviet Union: that the agenda contain two items, one drawn from the list submitted by you and the other from the list submitted by the Soviet Union, is a reasonable proposal, and we should try to reach agreement on that basis.

I also see much merit in the proposal put before us by the representative of the United Arab Republic: that if we cannot agree on an agenda we should try to discuss the matter informally in the Committee. If I understood Mr. Hassan aright, he proposed that we either transform this meeting into an informal meeting in order to pursue our discussion, or agree to meet informally at some other time for discussion of the agenda. As far as my delegation is concerned, we should be agreeable to either of those courses.

Mr. BARRINGTON (Burma): I should like to associate my delegation with the tributes which have been paid to you, Mr. Chairman, and to Mr. Tsarapkin for your efforts to reach agreement since our last meeting. We regret that it has not been possible so far to succeed. We can understand the point of view you have put forward this morning, Mr. Chairman, that any agreement reached should not exclude the presentation of items which have not yet been brought before the Committee; but we do not think that there need be any inconsistency between that point of view and the fixing of an agenda at this stage. After all, we have only two meetings of the Committee a week, and my delegation sees no reason why we should not have an additional meeting, if necessary, every week, so as to take care of both those aspects.

We do believe, however, that the best way of making progress on this question of procedure is possibly to adopt the very wise suggestion made by our colleague of the United Arab Republic: that we should have an informal meeting at which we could go into this matter more thoroughly. I personally do not favour the idea that we should go into informal meeting at once — I think it would be wiser to leave a little more time for reflection —; but I do think we should have an informal meeting fairly soon, possibly next Monday or next Wednesday.

Ato AGEDE (Ethiopia): I also should like to associate my delegation with the others in the expression of appreciation for the efforts made by the two co-Chairmen to solve the problem which has arisen. My delegation has already made it clear that it would be most desirable to have some order in our agenda; but I do not propose to go into that now beyond saying that we still feel very

(Ato Agede, Ethiopia)

strongly about reaching an agreement on the order of the agenda -- not necessarily on a given point, but at least upon seeking a way for finding the points on which such an agreement would be reached. Since it has appeared difficult so far to arrive at a solution by the method which has been followed, we cannot but support the idea put forward by our colleague of the United Arab Republic to the effect that perhaps at the proper time it would be useful if this matter were discussed informally and a way found of solving this particular problem.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): Much as we appreciate the endeavours of our co-Chairmen, we cannot but express regret that they have not been able to arrive at an agreed proposal on such a serious matter. We are faced, on the one hand, with the absence of an agreed proposal from the co-Chairmen on how we should proceed in our work; and on the other hand with a general recognition that we must introduce some kind of order into the discussion of the so-called collateral measures if we want the Committee to achieve any tangible results. We are faced with the prospect of a never-ending debate.

It is obvious that in these circumstances there is hardly any possibility other than the one pointed out to us today by the representative of the United Arab Republic. If we understand him correctly, he suggests that we should assist our co-Chairmen and by our joint efforts introduce order into the discussion of the questions relating to the easing of international tension. I asked for the floor in order to associate myself with that proposal.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I should like to make a brief remark concerning the statement we have just heard from the representative of Poland. He said that, of the two topics proposed by the Soviet delegation for priority examination, one appeared on the Soviet list and the other on the United States list. That is partially correct. One subject was indeed taken from the Soviet list; but the other appears in both lists. Accordingly the situation is somewhat different.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

In any case, if I understood Mr. Tsarapkin aright, the first topic he would like to discuss is the one selected from the Soviet list. In this connexion I should like to remind you that in 1962, when we accepted a Soviet proposal as the first subject of our discussion, the results were not very constructive. Be that as it may, at the present stage of our discussions we do not yet possess sufficient data to give us a clear idea of the Soviet delegation's attitude towards the United States proposals, which are of greater interest to us. The Soviet delegation has not yet taken a stand on the proposal for freezing strategic nuclear missiles, or on the United States proposal to stop production of fissile materials for military uses. Without this information the Committee cannot undertake a thorough discussion of the agenda.

Personally I have no objection to an informal meeting. Nevertheless, although in the past my delegation has often supported the idea of informal meetings without a specific agenda, I do not think the situation has yet matured to the extent that the Committee can make any serious contribution to the preparation of an agenda.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): I should like to support the idea advanced by our colleague from Burma: that we should have an informal meeting to discuss this question. I should like to make it more specific. He suggested either Monday or Wednesday. I should like to suggest Wednesday, to give us sufficient time for reflection.

I should like to add to that the proposal that we now stop the procedural discussion in this meeting and go ahead with the regular order of speeches.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): I should like to make one remark, if I may, still on the same subject. It seems to me that one of the

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excellent arrangements of this Conference is the establishment of a "steering committee", as one might call it, consisting of the two co-Chairmen, to discuss and agree on procedural matters, since in that way the interests of members of the Committee have in the past been best served and will in the future, I believe, be best served on procedural matters.

I think this morning's discussion has been very useful in making recommendations on what might be done now to move the Conference forward more rapidly. I can assure the Committee that the United States co-Chairman will take note of those recommendations, which contain a number of suggestions, including that for an informal meeting --- perhaps some time next week. I would suggest that this matter be left to the co-Chairmen for some progress in that direction and, indeed, if possible in the direction of a recommendation to such a meeting on an agenda, if one can be agreed.

Unless there are other comments, I would simply say that I am sure my co-Chairman has also taken note of the recommendations. Perhaps it will be impossible for me to meet him as co-Chairman on this subject; but I can assure him that the head of the United States delegation will always be available for the discussions of the co-Chairmen, which over the years have proved not only interesting but, I believe, useful.

I shall now call upon the speakers in the order in which they are inscribed on my list.

Mr. ZEMLA (Czechoslovakia): Before coming to my statement I should like to associate myself with those representatives who have thanked the two co-Chairmen for their efforts to reach an agreement on an agenda.

In the view of the Czechoslovak delegation, the striking feature of our meetings on Thursdays is that our deliberations are in an increasing measure becoming focused on the question of the reduction of military budgets. This attests to the fact that the absolute majority of the States members of this Committee are aware of the far-reaching positive effects that an agreement on this important issue would have, not only on disarmament negotiations but on the

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whole international situation. That is why my delegation wishes to identify itself with the words of the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Castro, who spoke at the meeting of the Committee on 20 February in favour of a detailed consideration of the question of military budgets and expressed the hope that the Committee would be able to demonstrate to the people of the world that —

"... we are endeavouring to find a solution to the problem and that the Conference desires, not to prevent discussing disarmament, but to bring it about," (ENDC/PV.168, p.23)

At the same time we cannot but observe that, in regard to priority consideration of the question of the reduction of military budgets, some delegations in our Committee continue to adhere to a position which so far has prevented the reaching of agreement by the two co-Chairmen on the order in which collateral measures should be discussed, as we were informed only this morning.

Here I have in mind the statement of the United States representative, Mr. Foster, at our meeting on 20 February, when he attempted to justify the negative position of the United States delegation on this question by asserting:

"Reductions of military budgets are the consequence, not the cause, of reduction in tensions." (ibid., p.21)

My delegation cannot agree with that assertion by the United States representative. It is our belief that matters cannot be posed so categorically, since the consequence and the cause in this case are two sides of one coin.

It is true that a certain improvement in the international situation recorded last year made it possible for some governments to decide on a reduction in their military budgets for 1964. However, hardly anyone would deny that further action on the part of governments in the direction of reducing military budgets would have very favourable effects in increasing confidence in international relations and improving further the international situation. The reaching of agreement on this question should not meet serious obstacles. That is particularly true inasmuch as there exists a rough military balance between the East and West, as representatives of the Western Powers have underlined in this forum on a number of occasions.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

A decision by governments to effect a reduction in their military budgets on the basis of a treaty would, in our view, constitute a significant and convincing expression of their will and determination to bring the arms race to a halt and to contribute by positive deeds to the solution of the disarmament issue. We wish, therefore, in this context to associate ourselves with the words of the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, who at our meeting of 20 February expressed himself in favour of the proposal of the Soviet Government for a 10 --15 per cent reduction of military budgets and emphasized:

"Apart from the salutary effect on the general armaments picture, such an agreement ... would serve as an example and an earnest to the world that the Powers concerned really meant business with regard to disarmament." (ibid., p.7)

We are gratified to state that the Governments of a number of countries have already made known their positive views in this respect.

Further, I should like to point out that a lessening of international tension does not always lead automatically to a reduction of military budgets, as Mr. Foster asserted here. That is evident from some of the facts of the present time, which are very well known to us. Although it has been declared all over the world that there was a certain easing of international tension in 1963, the Governments of some countries which are members of NATO -- for instance, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France -- deem it necessary to continue to increase their military budgets. Such steps by the Governments of the countries I have mentioned can hardly be justified as having been necessitated by increased tensions or by their so-called peace-keeping obligations in different parts of the world. Here I think it is more appropriate to pose the serious question whether the deeds of those Governments are compatible with their proclaimed readiness to bring disarmament about.

On 6 February my delegation had the opportunity to point out briefly wherein lies the importance of reducing military budgets, as we see it (ENDC/PV.164, pp.27 et seq.) A systematic increase of military expenditures causes difficulties even in the economically most powerful countries. A substantial reduction of

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military expenditures, as many delegations have pointed out here, would release large funds that would thus be available for further development of the national economies of the countries concerned and raising the standards of living of their populations as well as for the expansion of economic assistance to developing countries. That was evidently the idea that the Brazilian delegation had in mind when it submitted its working paper (ENDC/126) at our 166th meeting.

The significance of a reduction of military budgets cannot be underestimated either from the military point of view. If such a reduction were effected, it would bring about a considerable decrease in the military potentials of States, even though they might apply the agreed measures to specific sectors of their respective military machines as they might find appropriate. I have already mentioned the important implications in the political sphere of a reduction of military budgets.

At this juncture, when the majority of delegations in this Committee and an overwhelming majority of governments in the world at large are aware of the usefulness and urgency of reaching agreement on the reduction of military budgets, the Soviet delegation has recommended at the meeting of 20 February that the Committee focus its attention on two specific matters: the formulation of an appeal by the Committee to other countries to follow the example of the Soviet Union, the United States and other countries by unilaterally reducing their military budgets; and the preparation of a draft international agreement on the reduction of military budgets by 10 to 15 per cent (ENDC/PV.168, p.19).

The Czechoslovak delegation regards those suggestions of the Soviet delegation as timely and useful and fully supports them. We do so as the delegation of a country whose Government has also decided to reduce its military expenditure by 3.4 per cent in 1964 as compared with 1963. My delegation wishes to express its conviction that the recommendation of the Soviet delegation will meet with a favourable response from all delegations in this Committee.

In this connexion, my delegation could hardly help being surprised when it heard the first response by the United States delegation to the Soviet proposal. The United States representative, Mr. Foster, declared that the best means of saving more funds for the betterment of mankind would be "concrete, verified disarmament

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agreements -- not vague, unenforceable resolutions" (ibid., p.21). He called on the Committee to "concentrate on meaningful measures which will deal with the basic problem of disarmament: the weapons themselves." (ibid.)

The representative of Brazil, Mr. de Castro, very aptly pointed out at the same meeting that, while the disarmament talks may continue for some time to be faced with the difficulties with which we are only too familiar, the reduction of military budgets could be effected without special difficulties and would be conducive to decreasing the military potentials of States by indirect means (ibid., p.22)

We find it difficult to agree with the United States representative, who likened the two Soviet proposals I have mentioned to "vague, unenforceable resolutions". We believe it should not be forgotten that various significant resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, including resolution 1884 (XVIII) on the commitment to refrain from placing in orbit any object carrying weapons of mass destruction, are likewise unenforceable, and yet nobody questions their importance. As far as resolution 1884 (XVIII) is concerned, it has been stated in this forum quite unequivocally that that resolution represents a significant step forward in the efforts to alleviate international tension. It is beyond doubt that our unanimous approval of the proposed appeal by the Committee for unilateral reduction of military budgets would have a positive impact on the development of the international situation in the future and would enhance the prestige of our Committee.

Finally, the proposed international agreement on the reduction of military budgets would have all the formal requirements of an international agreement and would also contain appropriate control measures.

We hope, therefore, that the position taken on the Soviet proposal by the representative of the United States at our 168th meeting is not the last word of the United States delegation on this subject. We hope that his delegation will proceed to examine the Soviet proposal with full responsibility and that the Committee will be in a position speedily to undertake specific consideration of questions pertaining to military budgets and proposals submitted in respect thereof.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

My delegation has already had the opportunity to say (ENDC/PV.164, p.23) that, in addition to the question of reducing military budgets, it deems it important that the Committee should discuss other proposals for collateral measures --- first and foremost those contained in the memorandum of the Government of the USSR of 28 January 1964 (ENDC/123).

Another measure the consideration of which enjoys the support of practically all the delegations in this Committee is the taking of effective steps to prevent further dissemination of nuclear weapons. As is well known, appropriate proposals have been submitted by both sides. It is becoming evident, however, that the main obstacle in the way of achieving agreement on this subject is the intention of the Western Powers to establish a NATO multilateral force. Permit me to make a few observations on this problem on behalf of my delegation.

The delegations of the member States of NATO --- and most recently the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Butler, at our meeting on 25 February -- repeatedly assert that the creation of such a force would not be tantamount to placing nuclear weapons under the national control of other countries and that, to quote the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom:

"... there is nothing in the idea of a multilateral force which is in any way contrary to the principle of non-dissemination". (ENDC/PV.169, p.11)

The delegations of the socialist States have again and again pointed out here that nobody can deny that the creation of a NATO multilateral force in its presumed form would in fact constitute a new and extremely dangerous factor in the field of nuclear armaments. Effective steps to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons must apply both to individual States and to groups of States and various organizations, including military groupings.

Further, let us note the aspects of the so-called guarantees. Western representatives repeatedly emphasize that the Federal Republic of Germany cannot gain control over these weapons within the multilateral nuclear force. At the same time they make attempts to present the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in the most favourable light possible.

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

For example, the representative of Italy, Mr. Cavalletti, said at our meeting of 28 January:

"I should like to remind you once again that the Federal Republic of Germany is the only country which has entered into a formal legal pledge not to possess any atomic weapons. Moreover, it is unjust to suspect the Federal Republic of Germany of fostering dangerous territorial aspirations ..." (ENDC/PV.160, p.31).

Mr. Cavalletti emphasized that the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force not only would not lead to what the socialist delegations refer to but ---

"... would constitute a guarantee that nuclear weapons would not spread."
(ibid., p.30)

Let us admit for a moment that the policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is truly as its allies in NATO present it, and that the military circles of the Federal Republic of Germany do not make efforts to gain control over nuclear weapons. Why, then, do the representatives of Western Powers on various occasions emphasize that it is only the establishment of a multilateral nuclear force that may prevent access by the Federal Republic of Germany to control over these weapons? They allege that without it one cannot exclude the possibility that the Federal Republic of Germany will seek its own way, possibly in co-operation with France. Do you not see that this only confirms the justification of our point, that the military circles in the Federal Republic of Germany see the multilateral nuclear force of NATO as a way of ensuring for themselves, at the beginning at least, partial access to control over nuclear weapons?

In assessing the policy of the Federal Republic of Germany, my country proceeds from the basis of its past experiences with German imperialism and the developments in the Federal Republic of Germany in recent years. We can hardly forget the pronouncement by the former Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. Strauss, who in December 1961 defined the possession of nuclear weapons and the right to dispose of them as ---

"a symbol, or even a characteristic feature determining the criterion of sovereignty" (Bulletin des Presse und Informations-amtes der Bundesregierung, 1 December 1961).

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

As is well known, Mr. Strauss's successor, Mr. von Hassel, has announced that he would carry on the policy of his predecessor.

As far as we are aware, today's military and political representatives and spokesmen of West Germany's policy would not withdraw their categorical demands for nuclear weapons. Nor have they proposed the concluding by the two German States of a treaty renouncing nuclear weapons, as the Government of the German Democratic Republic has done (ENDC/124). On the contrary, they confirm the course they have adopted and do not conceal the fact that they regard the NATO multilateral nuclear force as merely a temporary solution. In this connexion, permit me to quote only the Chairman of the Military Committee of the Bundestag, Mr. Jäger, who on 25 November 1963 called the NATO multilateral nuclear force a provisional solution because, as he said --

"the real partnership within NATO is possible for a longer time only when monopolistic claims with regard to nuclear weapons are abandoned".

The representatives of NATO countries must not reproach us and regard our observations of certain facts with regard to the Federal Republic of Germany as attempts to bring the "cold war" into our deliberations. These facts make it clear that today the Bundeswehr has available an ever-growing number of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles of different types, of which some -- for example, the Pershing missile of 600 km range -- may reach two-thirds of the territory of our country. Apart from the means of delivery, the Federal Republic of Germany has available the personnel, trained in the United States, to handle these weapons.

What about the so-called guarantees embodied in the 1954 Paris Agreements, which were referred to by the representative of Italy (ENDC/PV.160, p.31)? It would not be in the least difficult to mention here how many times in the past those agreements have been revised in favour of increased armaments in the Federal Republic of Germany. If we take into account the present political and military aspirations of the Federal Republic of Germany, do you not think that references to any obligations stemming from the Paris Agreements sound completely unconvincing?

(Mr. Zemla, Czechoslovakia)

The fact that the effectiveness of similar legal guarantees regarding the Federal Republic of Germany is highly doubtful was convincingly confirmed also by the well-known United States personality, Mr. G.F. Kennan, in his article in the January issue of Foreign Affairs. He said:

"Finally, they" -- the Western Powers -- "have exhibited no very convincing evidence of any disposition to place effective limits on the rearmament of West Germany, where one restriction after the other established in earlier years has quietly gone by the board, and where the Germans are now, in the view of everybody in Eastern Europe, well on the way to becoming in all essential respects a full-fledged nuclear Power."

The same conclusion was drawn at the eleventh Pugwash Conference held in Dubrovnik last September, which openly expressed concern that the establishment of a NATO multilateral nuclear force would pave the way for the nuclear armament of West Germany.

I should like to conclude the few comments of the Czechoslovak delegation on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons by quoting a well-known French politician and disarmament expert, Mr. Jules Moch. In his book "Non à la Force de Frappe" Mr. Jules Moch came to the conclusion that the present conditions necessitate ---
(continued in French)

"... the abolition of all striking forces through disarmament. In no other direction can safety be found. While waiting to attain this goal, for we know by experience how long is the path that leads to it, wisdom dictates that no national or multilateral element should be added to the two gigantic striking forces which confront each other, neither daring to attack the other or its allies ... This is both wise and in the interests of world peace."

(continued in English)

In the light of the facts I have mentioned, the socialist countries therefore justly demand that the guarantees to prevent a further dissemination of nuclear weapons should really be effective and that they should allow neither a direct handing over of these weapons to the national control of other States nor their spread indirectly through military alignments.

Mr. NEHRU (India): At our last meeting it was our privilege to welcome the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom. We listened to his statement with great interest and we were encouraged by his appreciation of our work. The suggestions which he made are being carefully studied by the Indian delegation.

As I am speaking for the first time since Ambassador Hassan's return, may I say how glad I am to see him here? We are now in the fifth week of the present session of our Conference. At alternate meetings we are considering various issues relating to disarmament, and collateral (or partial) measures. Today's meeting is on collateral measures, and I am taking the opportunity to explain the broad approach of my delegation to this question and also our views on specific measures.

Our approach to this question is basically the same as that of other delegations. The primary task of our Committee is to negotiate an agreement on general and complete disarmament. Our negotiations are proceeding, but differences in regard to some key issues have created a deadlock. Further discussions in our Committee may show some way of reducing the differences. Perhaps it may be possible, as time goes on, to break the deadlock by considering some of the issues from a fresh angle.

In regard to this fresh angle, our delegation has at a previous meeting made some tentative suggestions (ENDC/PV.167, pp.19 et seq.). Our colleague from the United Arab Republic has also made some suggestions (ENDC/PV.169, pp. 33 et seq.). However, the deadlock, in our view, has some deeper causes. At bottom it seems to be a result of lack of confidence and trust --- which is an outcome of the prevailing tensions. It is here that some of the collateral, or partial, measures which we are considering could be of some help. Agreement on small measures could have the effect of creating greater confidence. Some of these measures are also included in the two disarmament plans, on which our discussions have not made much progress. If we could get them out of the way by partial agreements, the gap between the two plans would be narrowed. There again, collateral measures, in some cases, do not seem to require too much verification and control. In such cases it might be possible to try out simpler methods of verification in the first instance. This would help to create a body of experience which could be enlarged, step by step, as we move towards disarmament.

(Mr. Nehru, India)

Another consideration, as we all know, is that the three agreements of last year have helped to create a new atmosphere. There is a marked improvement in the international situation, and one of our basic tasks today is to keep this improvement alive. All these agreements were on collateral measures, and if we could have more of such agreements the results would be all to the good. The agreements would have the effect of strengthening the favourable trends in the international situation.

For all these reasons, we attach the highest importance to collateral measures. It has been suggested that any measure which is ripe for an agreement may be taken up first. We agree with this view, and we also agree that it would be helpful if some agenda could be fixed for our discussions. On the question of an agenda, it was my intention to say something in the course of this statement. However, we have already had a discussion on this subject; so I do not wish to say anything more. All that I should like to say is that we are grateful to you, Mr. Chairman, and also to your co-Chairman for the efforts which you have made to reach an agreement on this question, and also for agreeing to consider some of the suggestions which have been made this morning in our Committee.

There is another point on which I am sure all our delegations will agree. Each side, and indeed every country participating in our negotiations, has its own interests and distinctive outlook. It has some special concerns, based on its history and experience, which may not be shared by others. It might be easier in such cases to reach an agreement if both sides were to show a greater spirit of accommodation. Each side would have to consider and respect the legitimate concerns and interests of the other.

I turn now to the specific measures which have been proposed for discussion. We have two lists before us. There are five measures in the United States list (ENDC/120) and nine measures in the Soviet memorandum (ENDC/123). Some of these measures seem to overlap, while others have not yet been discussed in our Committee. I propose to confine my remarks to the few measures on which discussion has started and one or two other important measures.

(Mr. Nehru, India)

There has been no discussion in our Committee on a comprehensive test ban. We appreciate the difficulties involved in reaching an early agreement on this question. It is possible that this measure is less ripe for an agreement than some others. However, I think we should not for that reason avoid all discussion on a comprehensive test ban. This measure has indeed been included in both lists. The General Assembly has also asked us to take it up with a sense of urgency (A/RES/1910 (XVIII); ENDC/116). It has noted with satisfaction that the two nuclear Powers are continuing their negotiations. Therefore this question will have to be taken up at some time or other, and we hope we shall be informed how the negotiations are proceeding.

In regard to inspection, it seems that there is still no agreement among the nuclear Powers. It is our hope that in the course of further negotiations some of the suggestions which have been made by the non-aligned countries on this question will receive fuller consideration.

The partial test ban treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was an important gain, but I am sure we should all agree that it ought not to make us complacent. Until the ban has been extended to cover all tests, there will be a continuing danger of the dissemination of nuclear weapons, apart from many other dangers.

In the same group as the comprehensive test ban there are some other measures on which discussion has started in our Committee. Two of those measures are on the United States list, and Mr. Foster has explained them to us (ENDC/PV.166, p.16 et seq). Further explanations may be given later, and we shall no doubt also have fuller comments from Mr. Tsarapkin. We should particularly like to know the views of the Soviet Government on the proposed freeze of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and also on the proposals in regard to fissionable material. We ourselves would welcome any agreement having the effect of reducing or ending the nuclear arms race. However, there may be difficulties about verification, and the question of balance is also important. On all those questions further discussions may show how these difficulties could be met. We welcome the fact that in regard to fissionable material the United States has adopted a flexible position. It is

(Mr. Nehru, India)

prepared to transfer a larger amount to peaceful uses than is the Soviet Union. That is an important advance which has some bearing on the question of the balanced reduction of armaments. Symmetry, it seems to us, does not always produce balance, and it might be possible for both the sides to consider some new approach to this question.

There is a third measure in the nuclear field which is of the highest possible importance. A proposal for an agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons is included in both the lists. The proposed agreement has also been warmly supported by the General Assembly. In fact, it is a logical extension of the principle underlying the partial test ban. There is no specific proposal on this question from the Soviet side. Mr. Foster, however, has informed us (ENDC/PV.164, p.8) that the United States would like to enter into private discussions with the Soviet Union for the purpose of seeking an agreement on the basis of the Irish resolution on this question (A/RES/1665 (XVI)). He has also informed us that the United States does not intend to take any action inconsistent with the terms of that resolution. The view of the Soviet Union, if we have understood it correctly, is that any direct or indirect transfer of control of nuclear weapons or the sharing of control with any non-nuclear country, whether in a military alliance or otherwise, would be inconsistent with the principle of non-dissemination.

On this question of non-dissemination we have stated our views in the General Assembly on many occasions. In fact, our delegation was one of the first to raise this question, in 1956. Later, in 1961, we supported the Irish resolution, but we also thought it did not go far enough. In particular, we were not clear about the provisions relating to non-relinquishment of control. As this question has some bearing on the proposal now before us, I should like to quote from the summary record of the First Committee's meeting on 30 November 1961. The representative of India, while supporting the Irish resolution, made a statement to the following effect:

"One drawback of the draft resolution was that although it would prevent any transfer of control of nuclear weapons, it said nothing about the transfer of the weapons themselves. Thus, it would still allow troops belonging to non-nuclear countries to be trained in the use of such weapons, although control of them would continue to be vested in the

(Mr. Nehru, India)

present nuclear Powers. In those circumstances, it would not be difficult for the non-nuclear countries to gain physical control of those weapons. But there was no need for the smaller countries to possess nuclear weapons for purposes of national defence. The main use of such weapons was as a deterrent, and those possessed by the nuclear Powers fulfilled that role adequately." (A/C.1/SR.1209, para.10)

Mr. Aiken, the representative of Ireland, who had sponsored the resolution, replied in the following terms:

"The representative of India had observed that the control referred to in the Irish draft resolution ... was narrower than ownership; in fact it was wider, for under the draft resolution non-nuclear States would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons by ownership or by any other means." (ibid., para.12).

As the question of non-dissemination is being discussed on the basis of the Irish resolution, those observations seem to be pertinent. We should welcome discussion, whether private or otherwise, such as Mr. Foster has proposed. We feel, however, that the principle of non-dissemination or non-relinquishment of control of nuclear weapons should be interpreted liberally. If one side or the other has some special concern based on its historic experience, it should receive the fullest consideration. The ultimate objective of all our efforts is the total elimination and destruction of nuclear weapons. A non-dissemination agreement would be in some ways a provisional measure. We feel that nothing should be done, in regard to the disposition of existing weapons, which would come in the way of the ultimate objective.

Another measure on which discussion has started is the Soviet proposal for an agreement on cuts in military expenditure. The proposal is that all States should agree to cut their military expenditure by 10 to 15 per cent. Related to that is the proposal put forward in a working paper (ENDC/126) by our colleague from Brazil. There are other proposals in the same group which have not yet been discussed. Thus the Soviet Union has proposed cuts in the levels of armed forces, the removal of forces from foreign territories, and an agreement for the elimination of bombers.

(Mr. Nehru, India)

I shall confine myself today to proposals on which discussion has already started. As regards other proposals, they will no doubt be explained to us later.

In principle, we cannot object to cuts in military expenditure. In fact, in the past India has taken the lead in advocating cuts of that kind and the diversion of the funds so saved to peaceful uses. As a developing country, India would like to put an end to military expenditure altogether or to reduce it to a minimum. We are carrying out vast programmes of development in our country for the benefit of our people. We have no designs on other countries, and the level of our military expenditure has always been low. We have also welcomed the unilateral cuts which have been made by the Soviet Union and the United States. However, it is not easy for a country facing a threat of aggression to cut down military expenditure. We ourselves have been forced by circumstances to increase our expenditure to a level required for the defence of our country.

In this connexion I should like to refer to the proposal made by our Brazilian colleague. His proposal is that all States should reduce their military expenditures and that 20 per cent of the global value of the reductions should be credited to a special fund for development projects. I have already explained the difficulties involved for some countries in reducing their military expenditures. The steps that we ourselves have taken to strengthen our defences are a contribution to peace.

On other parts of the Brazilian proposal we should also like a fuller explanation. Why should it be necessary to create a special fund for this purpose? There are already a number of funds to which contributions could be made. If developing countries can carry out reductions, should they not utilize the savings for their own development plans? That might make them less dependent on foreign aid. The 20 per cent contribution, if agreed to, could

(Mr. Nehru, India)

be restricted to the more developed countries. Finally, is our Committee a proper forum for the discussion of this proposal, or should it be referred to some other international body?

All these are matters of detail which will no doubt receive our consideration. The basic point, however, is that disarmament and development, in our view, go hand in hand. Mr. de Castro has stressed that point, and we are glad that he has done so. Disarmament and cuts in military expenditure would help to release resources which should be utilized to the maximum extent for purposes of development. That would help to reduce the dangerous tensions which are being created by the growing disparity between the rich and the poor nations. Thus disarmament and development are closely interrelated, and both are essential for the strengthening of peace.

We agree with Mr. de Castro's broad approach to this question. We also consider that in this matter a special responsibility lies on the more developed and richer nations, which also happen to be the most heavily armed.

I have confined my remarks today to some of the measures on which discussion has begun. On other measures, which are also important, we shall state our views at later meetings.

Mr. LUKANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from Russian): During the debates at the present session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee several delegations have spoken in support of the need to concentrate our attention on specific questions in the field of "collateral measures", so that they may be solved one after the other. The present meeting has confirmed still more clearly the desire of the majority of the members of the Committee in this respect.

In fact, a general discussion cannot go on endlessly. An endless general discussion will not lead to any concrete solutions in our Committee. Still less can one expect such solutions if there is no clearness of purpose, and if the purpose underlying the discussion is not that of concluding it by working out an agreed opinion and a solution based thereon.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Meanwhile, as many have said here, time does not wait. We are already hard pressed for time and we must make haste. Evidently the whole problem boils down to the following: what are we to start with; which problem is considered most ripe for solution; and which question can be solved in the shortest possible time?

In analysing carefully the statements and proposals which had been made up to now during the present session, it seems to us that the conclusion to be drawn is precisely in favour of the problem of reducing military budgets. This question suggests itself more than any other for inclusion in an agenda of businesslike discussions and will rightly take top priority in our forthcoming work on the elaboration of collateral measures preceding general and complete disarmament. It was not by chance that the last meeting on collateral measures was almost entirely devoted to the question of reducing military budgets (ENDC/PV.168). Quite naturally, in the absence of agreed recommendations of our co-Chairmen on the priority of the collateral measures to be considered, the question of the possibility of recommending a reduction in the military expenditures of States took first place. Thus it was unequivocally emphasized that the achievement of an agreement to reduce military budgets would be to the advantage of all and that it would be possible for the Committee to discuss and solve this question in the very near future.

What reasons have we for drawing such a conclusion? First of all, we have the example of the great Powers. It is admitted by everyone that the initiative of the Government of the Soviet Union to reduce its defence budget for 1964 by 600 million roubles, and the measures taken by the United States to cut down its military expenditures, have created favourable pre-conditions for reaching a formal agreement on a further and more important reduction by all States of the appropriations for military needs.

It is well known that the initiative of the Soviet Union and the United States has been welcomed with satisfaction by all those who are sincerely interested in the maintenance of peace and are therefore striving to bring about an immediate,

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

even though gradual, easing of tension in the world. There is no country where the idea of worthily imitating example, of a State policy of "mutual example", has not been taken up. It is true that there are some governments which, contrary to the interests and desires of the peoples, have increased their military budgets instead of reducing them, as is particularly the case in the Federal Republic of Germany, even though its military budget had already exceeded the monstrous military budget of Hitler's Reich on the eve of the Second World War. However, the discord introduced into the general international atmosphere by such actions cannot hide from us the fact that a reduction in expenditures for military preparations has become a present-day requirement.

All three groups of States existing in the world today are represented in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. No objection in principle to a reduction in military budgets has been heard in this chamber from any quarter. On the contrary, as, for instance, the United States representative said in his speech at the meeting on 13 February:

"We should welcome a reduction in the military budgets of all States..."

"We agree that one of our key objectives should be to reduce military budgets." (ENDC/PV.166, pp. 15, 16)

Representatives of non-aligned States have spoken in favour of a reduction in military budgets both at the United Nations General Assembly and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The statement of the representative of Burma has been quoted. He said

"... we see no reason why the budgets of the main armed Powers should not be reduced by 10 to 15 per cent as proposed by the Soviet Union."

(ENDC/PV.168, p. 7)

The leader of the Brazilian delegation stated, in his turn:

"... there could be no clearer demonstration of our good faith than to reduce military budgets and withhold the resources for accelerating the armaments race." (ibid., p.23)

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

At our last meeting the representatives of the United Arab Republic and Nigeria spoke briefly but clearly on the reduction of military budgets. (ENDC/PV.169, pp. 34, 35).

We do not intend to dwell at present on the economic advantages and the favourable effects that a more extensive reduction of military expenditures would have for all peoples without exception. Many representatives have dealt with this aspect of the problem and, furthermore, each of us has a sufficiently clear idea of the usefulness of releasing these resources and assigning them to meeting the needs of peaceful construction. There is no people, great or small, that does not feel the burden of military expenditures. There is no government which is not aware of the immense amount of resources diverted to unproductive military purposes instead of being used for the implementation of programmes for the development of the economy, education, public health and scientific research. It is no secret that these programmes often suffer from an acute lack of resources. Nor do we underestimate in the least the considerably greater opportunities which a reduction of military budgets would open up for rendering greater assistance to developing countries on both a bilateral and a multilateral basis -- within the framework of the programmes of the United Nations.

But as far as we, the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, are concerned, we are interested, above all, in another aspect of the problem: how far the reduction of military expenditures on the basis of a formal international agreement would be a factor in the further easing of international tension and a serious obstacle in the way of the armaments race. Many delegations have already pointed out the undoubted practical usefulness of such an agreement for the cause of disarmament.

As a matter of fact, a reduction in the resources assigned to armament is a part of the actual process of disarmament. However, for the time being we are merely concerned with the initial stage, which practically relates only to the armaments race and not to the basic means of warfare. The tremendous growth of military budgets, the diverting of resources amounting to milliards to military needs, has

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become an ominous phantom which not only accompanies the frenzied armaments race but precedes and unequivocally predetermines the development of international relations. It is impossible to increase or improve the means of warfare -- in other words, there can be no plans or preparations for war -- without increasing expenditures on military needs. This is particularly true in the days of nuclear-missile armaments.

Expenditures on military needs before the First and Second World Wars had reached a level which showed quite clearly that aggressive and militaristic Powers were planning to unleash war. But since 1945, and particularly in the last few years, the armaments race has assumed proportions which it would have been difficult to imagine in 1914 or 1939.

Let us consider the facts. In 1914, States had five million men under arms in peacetime. Now there are more than sixteen million men under arms. In 1914, \$1.5 milliard was spent on preparations for war; at present \$120 milliard per year is being spent on military needs. It is obvious that the percentages of possible reductions about which we are speaking here would in fact affect only part of the military potential of States and would mainly relate to planned measures which have not yet been implemented. Yet they would be an obstacle in the way of the armaments race. As regards the desired easing of tension in the world, here also the result would undoubtedly be a positive one. The budget is called the reflection of a government's policy. It is indeed. Hence the political and psychological effects to which an agreement to reduce military budgets would lead. It would mean that States are turning towards peace, that they wish to avoid war, and that they are ready to start disarming.

Briefly, in favour of giving priority to consideration of the proposal for a reduction of military expenditures there are a number of irrefutable arguments: there is the realization of the importance of releasing material and moral resources and forces for social progress, the general conviction that this would mean a practical beginning of real disarmament, and the certitude that in this way it would

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be possible at once to take another step towards a further improvement of international relations. We cannot fail to mention also how ripe for consideration this question is. I refer to the Soviet Government's proposal contained in its memorandum (ENDC/123) and expounded in detail by the leader of the Soviet delegation at our meeting of 20 February (ENDC/PV.168, pp. 17 et seq.), and the proposal of the Government of Brazil (ENDC/126), which Mr. de Castro introduced on 13 February (ENDC/PV.166, pp. 5 et seq.). It can easily be seen that both proposals contain provisions corresponding to the views of the majority of the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

Let us take as an example the tenth and eleventh paragraphs of the Brazilian working paper. After welcoming in the tenth paragraph the decision of the Governments of the Soviet Union and the United States to reduce their military budgets, in the eleventh paragraph there is a request to all States to endeavour to demonstrate by practical measures their desire for peace by carrying out reductions of the same nature in their respective military budgets.

Is there among us any delegation which has not welcomed the reduction of military expenditures by the Soviet Union and the United States? Are there among us any opponents of the policy of "mutual example", if the example is a good one? There are no such people. Then what would prevent us from accepting the proposal to draft a document embodying an appeal to all States, and in the first place to the States with the greatest military potential, to follow the example of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and to reduce their military budgets? In doing so it seems to us that we could take as a basis the aforementioned paragraphs of the working paper of the Brazilian delegation. One can easily imagine the positive significance for the improvement of the international atmosphere that would attach to a preliminary report of the Eighteen-Nation Committee mentioning the drafting of a document containing an appeal to States to reduce their expenditures on war preparations.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

In addition to this favourable result, the agreement which we should have achieved here would greatly facilitate our next step -- the discussion and elaboration of an international draft agreement on the reduction of the military budgets of all States by 10 - 15 per cent, as proposed by the Soviet Union. Obviously in this respect the Committee will be dealing with a clear and unambiguous proposal: to decide on a reduction of military expenditures by 10 - 15 per cent, while leaving it to the discretion of States themselves to determine in what respect these reductions are to be made.

We have heard no objections to the substance of this proposal. Although at our meeting of 20 February Mr. Foster gave the impression that he did not agree with the proposal, (ENDC/PV.168, p.24) and now seems to have made this even more obvious to us, (supra, p. 7) we shall look forward to hearing from the United States delegation a detailed exposition of its reservations and doubts, if it has any, or else its agreement with the majority of the members of the Committee, if the reservations and doubts prove to be unjustified. At the present meeting, for instance, we heard for the first time that the work of our Committee could be hampered by the constitutional methods of procedure of certain States. We hope to return to this argument in order to prove its invalidity where the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is concerned. For the time being we shall confine ourselves to the following remark: the procedures prescribed by the constitution of any State should yield to the interests of universal peace.

Mr. Foster rightly points out the interrelationship between the international climate and practical measures in the field of disarmament. But the interrelationship in this case, as in all cases in life, goes both ways, and the whole world would prefer the improvement of the climate to rest on a material foundation.

Although there are no objections in regard to substance, what other arguments can still be heard against the speediest possible solution of such an essential question as that of reducing the fabulous unproductive expenditures on military needs?

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

It has been pointed out that there are in the world many unsolved controversial questions and many international commitments on the part of a number of States. All this apparently justifies extraordinary military budgets, as well as the need for increasing them. At the end of the second year of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, after lengthy talks and negotiations on disarmament, after the bitter lessons of two world wars, it still appears possible to defend views which are incompatible with the history of mankind and the actual experience of life. There have been unsolved questions and disputes in international life, and always will be. How to deal with them, how to approach them and how to solve them -- that is the question. Should disputes be settled by recourse to weapons or by peaceful means? That is the problem that history has set before mankind. And if all of us here are in favour of settling international disputes by peaceful means, we must reject as invalid any views to the effect that unsolved problems can to any extent hamper agreements on disarmament and, in particular, on the reduction of expenditures on armaments and armed forces.

International life has shown us quite recently the consequences of a military budget which makes it possible to maintain, sometimes thousands of miles away from their own frontiers, armed forces whose purpose is to prevent peoples from living as they would like. Events in Africa and South East Asia clearly show the urgent need for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of other countries. An additional possibility for a considerable reduction of military expenditures would then follow automatically.

There are some people in the West who consider that inflated military budgets mean a flourishing economy, and that a considerable reduction of military expenditures could lead to economic difficulties and disturbances. It is well known that the United Nations has asked a special body to study the possible consequences of disarmament, and that its conclusions have so far been optimistic. In any case a gradual reduction of military expenditures would involve no economic risk.

(Mr. Lukanov, Bulgaria)

Mention has also been made of the difficulty of control in the event of a decision to reduce military budgets, in view of the differences in the structures of the budgets of various States. As we remember, a similar objection to the reduction of military budgets was put forward in the days of the League of Nations and, as far as we know, was rejected. Having such long experience, we cannot doubt that there is no unsurmountable obstacle in the present case. The main thing is to acknowledge clearly the will to disarm, and to give an undertaking to set about disarmament by beginning in practice to spend less and less money on armaments.

In this connexion we are bound to note the unconvincing nature of the United States proposal to reduce military budgets by "freezing" certain types of armaments, which would lead to a considerable reduction in expenditures. It seems that the contrary would be true. The intention of the Powers -- in particular the great Powers -- to curb the armaments race would find its clearest expression in a decision to limit appropriations for the purpose of increasing the quantity and improving the quality of existing armaments or creating new ones. As has been pointed out here, some States have drawn up long-term plans for the production of armaments up to 1966, in which provision is made for an almost twofold increase in costly and dangerous types of armaments. A gradual and ever greater reduction of military budgets would be a true sign that the aforementioned Powers intend to hold up and stop the implementation of their long-term plans for the production of armaments which, in any case, are superfluous.

Allow me to inform the Committee that the Bulgarian Government has reduced its expenditures for defence in the current year by more than ten per cent as compared with 1963. Of course, the People's Republic of Bulgaria is a small country and its budget cannot have the same importance as the military budgets of States with greater international weight. Nevertheless, the reduction of military expenditures of Bulgaria is a substantial contribution to the easing of the atmosphere in the Balkans, and clearly testifies to the sincere desire of the Bulgarian people and its leaders for peace, as was declared once again on 19 February 1964 in a joint Soviet-Bulgarian statement signed in Moscow by Chairmen Khrushchev and Zhivkov.

Thus all that has been stated in the foregoing convinces us that our Committee could achieve tangible and positive results the most rapidly and easily on the question of reducing military budgets. We support all proposals that aim at (a) adopting an appeal to States to follow the example of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and to start reducing their military expenditures; and (b) detailed and thorough consideration of the problem of reducing the military budgets of States, and the elaboration of a draft international agreement to that effect.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

(translation from Russian): The discussion which has taken place at previous meetings has shown convincingly that the majority of the members of the Committee consider it important and essential that the Committee should adopt a positive decision on the question of the reduction of military budgets. On 20 February the representative of Brazil, Mr. de Castro, said the following in this regard: "...all the members of this Committee, to whichever groups they belong, who have spoken on this question, have recognized that this collateral measure is really important and deserves detailed examination." (ENDC/PV.168, p.22)

The wide support given in the Committee to the proposal for the reduction of military budgets is, of course, not fortuitous. Many delegations convincingly showed in their statements that, on the one hand, the reduction of military budgets should lead to a reduction of the military potential of States and to a slowing down of the armaments race, which in itself would be a contribution to the cause of disarmament, and on the other hand that this measure would contribute considerably to peaceful economic development. Lastly, the reduction of military budgets cannot but lead to a great improvement of the whole international atmosphere, because it will demonstrate the real intention of States to contribute to the strengthening of peace, their real determination to take the path of putting an end to the armament race, and their desire to implement a disarmament programme. In this connexion I should like to remind you of the statement made on 20 February by the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, who pointed out that the reduction of military budgets:

"...would serve as an example and an earnest to the world that the Powers concerned really meant business with regard to disarmament." (ibid., p.7.)

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Naturally, all of us in the Committee awaited with particular attention and interest the reply to the proposal for the reduction of military budgets that would be made by representatives of the Western Powers and, first of all, of the United States of America. We all recollect the well-known speech of the late President Kennedy, delivered on 26 July of last year (ENDC/102), in which he stressed that "each increase in arms has produced an increase in tension," and appealed to the nation to make the most of "every opportunity to reduce tension, to slow down the perilous nuclear arms race." President Johnson, for his part, also uttered a warning against the dangers of the armaments race in his January message to Congress on budgetary matters, in which he pointed out that an excessive accumulation of armaments was provocative and wasteful. We shall not hide the fact that such statements led us to expect an immediate and positive reaction on the part of the United States and its Western allies to the proposal for the reduction of the military budgets of States.

We also took account of the fact that the United States Government, acting apparently in response to the reduction of the military budget of the Soviet Union for 1964, took definite steps towards reducing its military budget. All this encouraged the hope that here in the Committee we should succeed in establishing mutual understanding with the United States delegation, and that the Committee would be able to come to mutually-acceptable decisions in regard to further reductions of military budgets.

Unfortunately, however, we encountered something different. The United States representative, Mr. Foster, told us that the United States agrees:

"...that one of our key objectives should be to reduce military budgets." (ENDC/PV.166, p.16).

Later he said that the United States would

"...welcome it if any nation were able to reduce its military expenditures and to apply any such savings to the benefit of mankind." (ENDC/PV.168, p.21).

Everyone in the Committee thought that after such a statement the United States representative would be quite prepared to start discussing the proposal for the reduction of military budgets. How great was our disappointment and surprise, however, when we heard in the very same statement of the United States representative that in fact he is against the adoption by the Committee of a

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

decision on the question of reducing military budgets. In his statement, Mr. Foster said that:

"...concrete, verified disarmament agreements -- not vague, unenforceable resolutions -- are the best means of saving more funds for the betterment of mankind." (*ibid.*)

Frankly, it is difficult to understand the logic of these arguments. First of all, what grounds are there for talking about a "hortatory" request or a "vague" resolution? After all, the Soviet delegation has submitted to the Committee a concrete proposal for the reduction of military budgets by a specific percentage, namely 10 to 15 per cent. This proposal is quite concrete and practical, and it is self-evident that an agreement on this matter would have the force of an international commitment. Therefore, if Mr. Foster considers, as he stated, that "concrete" agreements are the best means of ending the armaments race and saving the vast sums spent on it for the betterment of mankind, he has an excellent opportunity to demonstrate in practice this willingness to conclude concrete agreements and to agree forthwith to the reduction of the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent.

On 20 February, Mr. Foster advanced as an argument against the Soviet proposal for the reduction of military budgets the view that the amount of any reduction:

"...whether by 10 or 15 per cent or any other proportion, would necessarily vary from country to country and would depend on the conditions and the present military budget of any particular country." (*ibid.*)

Of course we all agree that the amount of the reduction would vary from country to country; but we do not see in this any obstacle to an agreement to reduce the military budgets of States by 10 to 15 per cent. After all, the implementation of a programme of general and complete disarmament would mean unequal measures in regard to the amount for each country; but it would not enter anyone's mind to object to general and complete disarmament for that reason.

The main point is that the reduction of military budgets, irrespective of how great the amount of the funds to be reduced would be in each concrete case, would have a beneficial effect on the economy of the countries concerned, as well as on the international atmosphere as a whole.

Speaking on 20 February against the adoption by the Committee of a decision on the reduction of military budgets, Mr. Foster tried to make out that the United States proposal for a "freeze" of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles would automatically provide a key also to the solution of the problem of reducing

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

military expenditures. This statement of Mr. Foster's clearly showed a desire or tendency to replace the question of the reduction of military expenditures by a different question, namely a "freeze" of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ibid.)

Without going at present into a detailed evaluation of the substance of the United States proposal for a "freeze" of nuclear delivery vehicles, we deem it necessary to oppose any attempt to substitute this proposal for the proposal regarding the reduction of military budgets. In fact, this United States proposal means neither a cessation of the armaments race nor a reduction of military expenditures. This United States proposal means only a freezing of the production of strategic missiles and bomber aircraft, and nothing else. The production of all other types of modern armaments, such as intermediate-range missiles, tactical atomic weapons and conventional armaments, would continue under the United States proposal for "freezing", and consequently the armaments race in these fields would also continue. The United States proposal does not deal with the production of such types of weapons of mass destruction as bacteriological and chemical weapons. In general, the military budgets of States as a whole would by no means be reduced but, on the contrary, might even be increased.

In history there are a good many examples where not only the "freezing" but even the restriction or reduction of the production of any particular type of armament did not at all lead to the reduction of military expenditures, but the armaments race was simply switched to another field. The history of the development of military technology shows us that, even if the production of any particular type of armament is stopped completely and the models already produced are scrapped, overall military expenditures are by no means reduced but continue to increase. For instance, after the war it proved inexpedient to build more battleships; but, so far as we know, the resources released by this in Western countries were by no means applied to the development of a peace-time economy but were used to build aircraft carriers, atomic submarines and so forth. That is the situation in regard to the United States proposal for a freeze: it is not at all automatically connected with the problem of reducing military budgets, as Mr. Foster had tried to make out.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

There is something else we must not overlook. The United States proposal for the freezing of strategic delivery vehicles concerns in practice only two countries -- the United States of America and the Soviet Union. They are, of course, the most powerful countries militarily; but besides them there are other countries possessing a great military potential, such as the United Kingdom, France, Western Germany and so on. Moreover, such countries as the United Kingdom and France possess nuclear weapons, and Western Germany, as is well known, is persistently striving to obtain them. Well, Mr. Foster, do you consider that those countries can continue as before to increase their armed forces and armaments? Mr. Foster has passed over this question in silence. Yet the danger of the armament race in those countries is by no means imaginary, insignificant or abstract.

We have already drawn the attention of the Committee to the fact that, while we are discussing here the question of reducing military budgets, the Government of the United Kingdom, disregarding the possible consequences of such a step and ignoring the example set by the States which have reduced their military budgets, has considerably increased its military expenditures. Military expenditures are also increasing in Western Germany. Suffice it to say that in one year alone, from 1962 - 1963, they increased from 17.1 milliard to 20.5 milliard marks or by 20 per cent and that they already amount at present to 35 per cent of the entire budget of the Federal Republic of Germany. In this respect, as I have already pointed out at one of our earlier meetings (ENDC/PV.166. p.33), Western Germany is second only to the United States and to no one else.

This, as the Western Press now admits, cannot fail to arouse legitimate anxiety among all peoples and particularly among the peoples of Europe who have experienced all the horrors of the Second World War started by German militarism. The United Kingdom and Western Germany are members of NATO, and the strengthening of their military potential is a pointer to the intensification of the armaments race in this military bloc. Therefore Mr. Foster's desire to evade the problem of reducing military budgets and to substitute other questions for it looks, from an objective standpoint, like indirect support of the armaments race in NATO countries, the danger of which is obvious to everybody.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

In Mr. Foster's statements there is yet another assertion which we cannot disregard. Trying to justify his negative attitude to the question of reducing military budgets, Mr. Foster stated: "Reductions of military budgets are the consequence, not the cause, of reduction in tensions"; and that therefore a resolution or an agreement on the reduction of budgets would not "make tensions go away" (ENDC/PV.168, p.41).

Further, Mr. Foster referred to the fact that "there are many outstanding territorial and other disputes all around the world" (ENDC/PV.166, p.15) which, allegedly, made it impossible for various countries to reduce their military budgets. If what Mr. Foster said was not just a slip of the tongue, it gives food for serious thought. Indeed, if the reduction of military budgets, which directly cuts away the basis of the armaments race, cannot lead to a reduction of tension, then neither can any other measure on the Committee's agenda lead to this result. If the cause of tension lies somewhere outside the sphere of the questions with which we are dealing here, and if our efforts can have no influence on the easing of tension or on the lessening or elimination of the threat of war, then, naturally, the question arises: why are we sitting here and discussing the disarmament problem? Up to now, we considered that we had no disagreements on this question of principle, that we were all united in our conviction that general and complete disarmament was the key to universal peace. The statements of the United States representative are therefore bound to put us particularly on our guard. We consider -- and here we venture to repeat President Kennedy's words -- that "each increase in arms has produced an increase in tension". (ENDC/102, p.1)

Indeed, has not the fact that in the United States alone military expenditures are now four times as great as in 1949 increased international tension to a considerable extent? And conversely, have not the steps recently taken by various States to reduce their military budgets led to a definite easing of that tension? This has been admitted by everyone, including the United States. Suffice it to point out these examples in order to realize the groundlessness of such statements.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Mr. Foster's reference to territorial and other disputes also sounds unconvincing. Of course those disputes complicate the international situation. But efforts aimed at settling them cannot and should not be set in opposition to measures leading to disarmament. On the contrary, the less weapons there are in the world of today, the greater will be the progress in the field of disarmament, the easier it will be to find ways and means for a peaceful settlement of those disputes.

As you see, Mr. Foster, all the arguments you have put forward against achieving agreement in the Committee on the question of reducing the military budgets of States are hardly convincing. They have not shaken the general feeling of the Committee against any postponement of this question. We hope that, in view of this general feeling of the Committee, the United States delegation will reconsider its attitude and show readiness to reach agreement on a reduction of 10 to 15 per cent in the military budgets of States.

Mr. Chairman, we have learned that you are leaving the Committee and are going to Washington. We regret this, not only because you are leaving us, but also because you will not be able to report to your Government any success during the past month in the negotiations in which you have taken a direct part. However, there is a saying that "every cloud has a silver lining". Therefore, we hope that the experience you have acquired and your direct knowledge of the state of affairs in our Committee and of the moods prevailing in it will enable you, on returning to Washington, to take steps which will give an impetus to our negotiations and remove the obstacles standing in the way of progress in the disarmament negotiations.

Allow me to wish you, Mr. Foster, godspeed and, in the capital of the United States, fruitful activity which will make the attitude of the United States in the negotiations in the Committee more flexible and more constructive, and which will enable us to reach agreement both on questions of general and complete disarmament and on measures aimed at slowing down the armaments race and relaxing international tension.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. Tsarapkin, at least for your wishes of godspeed.

I should now like to make a few remarks as representative of the United States before I depart -- which will be in the course of this afternoon. It is necessary for me to return to resume direction of the activities of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. However, my absence is expected to be temporary, and the United States delegation here will be in close touch with me on a daily basis and will keep me apprised of the progress -- I hope -- of the Conference. I look forward to seeing all of you again in the not-too-distant future. Meanwhile the Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Adrian Fisher, whom many of you know, will be here with you as leader of the United States delegation.

At this time I wish to express my personal appreciation for the co-operation that we have received from all delegations, and also my appreciation to my co-Chairman, with whom I have had a good many meetings. I also wish to express my deep personal appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to his Deputy, and to the members of the Secretariat, all of whom have been very generous with their time and their assistance to us. In fact, conferences of this sort could not proceed without that generous support.

In my opinion, the most urgent task of this Committee is to maintain and to increase the momentum of agreement achieved in 1963. How and where we should direct our efforts in order to accomplish this task and to find new and broader areas of agreement are very difficult but very urgent questions. We must not forget that the forces we are dealing with are dynamic. While we negotiate here, the arms race goes on. While we debate, military and political relationships are in a continuing state of flux.

In the absence of verified disarmament agreements, the United States must continue to develop its defences. The representative of the Soviet Union showed us only one side of the coin at our meeting of 18 February. At that time he referred to the planned increases in United States strategic armaments (ENDC/PV.167, p.32). What he failed to say is that the United States arms increases are made in response

(The Chairman, United States)

to Soviet activities such as those described by Chairman Khrushchev to the General Assembly in 1960 when he said:

"In our country rockets are now being mass produced. Recently I was in a factory, and I saw rockets coming out like sausages from a sausage machine. Rocket after rocket is coming off our assembly lines." (A/PV.900, para. 189)

As recently as two weeks ago, on 14 February 1964, Chairman Khrushchev stated:

"The socialist nations have created armed forces which the leaders of imperialist Powers admit are equal to the forces of the capitalist world. We believe that our armed forces are more powerful."

Thus, in the absence of agreements which would halt the arms race, we must be responsive to the requirements of the security of the United States and the rest of the free world. But, as President Johnson made clear in his State of the Union Message on 8 January 1964:

"Even in the absence of agreement we must not stockpile arms beyond our needs or seek an excess of military power that could be provocative as well as wasteful."

The real hope for security is to break the vicious circle of the arms race. We recognize that this is as true for us as it is for the rest of the world. We have put forward proposals for concrete steps directed towards the achievement of this objective. A few of those proposals have already resulted in limited agreements. This Committee is now engaged in a search for other areas of agreement. While these may be difficult to find, the search can and must go on.

First, we should look for areas where mutual interest exists. The overlapping areas of interest are clear in past agreements on the "hot line" (ENDC/97), the limited ban on nuclear tests (ENDC/100/Rev.1), and the resolution prohibiting the orbiting of nuclear weapons in outer space (A/RES/1884 (XVIII); ENDC/117). Further agreements must also rest upon the common interest of all participants.

Second, areas of potential agreement are to be found in concrete proposals, not in exhortations or in unverifiable and illusory obligations. Sound principles upon which agreements are based must be derived from careful analysis of specific facts. Reluctance to examine the details of a proposed agreement may raise doubts about the soundness of the underlying principles.

(The Chairman, United States)

What are the most promising areas to explore in our search for further and more far-reaching agreements? President Johnson's message to the Conference (ENDC/120) sets forth five areas of potential agreement. It is based on careful study and analysis by the United States Government and on the President's personal conviction that the need for progress is immediate and not remote. The United States is ready to conclude firm agreements in the areas which have been proposed. The United States delegation proposes, at future meetings, to continue to develop the points in President Johnson's message as well as others. We would welcome the views of other delegations as we proceed.

As we have previously stated, points two and three of President Johnson's message are of particular importance. We believe they could well lead to agreements of mutual interest in the immediate future.

Point two calls for exploration of a verified freeze of the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive and defensive vehicles. We have already developed some of our ideas concerning that proposal at our meeting of 31 January (ENDC/PV.162, pp. 16 et seq.).

Point three calls for a halt in the further production of fissionable materials for weapon uses. This we discussed in some detail at our meeting of 13 February (ENDC/PV.166, pp.16 et seq.).

The United States delegation is fully aware of the importance and urgency of reaching agreement on reductions in all types of forces. But, while we talk about methods of reduction, levels of armaments on both sides are increasing almost without interruption. This is especially true of strategic armaments -- those missiles which are capable of delivering nuclear warheads over very long distances. Those are the armaments that are both the most destructive and the most costly.

It is therefore our urgent task to take steps now to halt this build-up on both sides. For example, United States strategic missile inventories have increased more than 200 per cent since our Conference began here in March 1962. By 1965 these inventories will reach approximately 750 per cent of those in 1962. As I have just pointed out, the Soviet Union also is increasing its missile forces. "A sharply rising line" describes the trend on both sides.

The United States, however, has now proposed in the freeze an alternative to the rising numbers and destructive capabilities of long-range armaments. Our further increases in strategic nuclear vehicles can be prevented if the Soviet Union will accept a verified freeze and halt its own further increases. The freeze would apply to characteristics as well as to numbers. This would prevent the rough balance in present strategic military relationships from being upset by future technological improvements and developments.

The United States cannot forgo its plans for further increases in strategic armaments unless it is reasonably sure that the Soviet Union has given up its own plans. Therefore such a freeze must be verified. Verification of the freeze, however, need not be burdensome. The system required to monitor effectively the freeze of strategic armaments would be more limited than that required for a freeze of all major armaments or for comprehensive reductions.

The United States delegation believes that a halt in the production of fissionable materials for use in weapons is also a proposal of major importance. Nuclear stockpiles are increasing as well as the means of delivering nuclear weapons. The United States has already announced plans to cut back its production of fissionable materials. At our meeting of 25 February the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom did the same (ENDC/PV.169, p.11). We are ready to agree with the Soviet Union to a complete cut-off or to a plant-by-plant shutdown.

As we indicated on 13 February, the inspection required would depend at the outset on whether the Soviet Union preferred a complete or a gradual shutdown (ENDC/PV.166, p.17). We believe that the plant-by-plant cut-off offers the Soviet Union a real opportunity to experiment with a very limited amount of inspection. That experience could, we hope, lead ultimately to an increased willingness to accept the extent of verification which would be required for broader measures. The important point is to make a start in the direction of limiting the amount of fissionable materials available for the production of nuclear warheads.

A halt in further increases in the levels of strategic armaments would freeze the most important area of the arms race. A halt in the further production of fissionable materials for weapon uses would freeze another important sector. These steps are certainly in the common interest. They can be taken now in the light of existing military and political realities. They are specific steps on the road to disarmament. When carried out they would permit substantial reductions in military budgets. Here are promising areas for early agreement.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): There was much in what our Soviet colleague said this morning with which perhaps even he would hardly expect me to agree; but there was one point on which I can agree wholeheartedly. Mr. Chairman, we can all agree with his expression of regret that the fact that you have many important assignments to undertake in the United States is now going to deprive us of your presence here with us for a time. I think we have all valued, not only the careful way in which you have explained the important proposals of the United States as embodied in President Johnson's message (ENDC/120), but also the conscientious way in which you have discharged for us your task as one of our two co-Chairmen. I am sure we all feel confident that your successor will be following along the same path.

You may perhaps remember that at our last meeting my own leader, the British Foreign Secretary, said that, though unfortunately he had many tasks which made it impossible for him to be constantly here with us, his advice and counsel were always at the disposal of the Committee (ENDC/PV.169, p. 20). I feel sure that we can count upon the same assurance from you. I think the best way in which we can express our gratitude to you is by carrying on our work in your absence in such a way that when you return to us you will find that the picture has brightened even beyond what it is at present.

The CHAIRMAN (United States of America): Thank you very much, Sir Paul. I will make myself available at any time in any way in which I can be helpful in furthering the progress of this Conference.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 170th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of Mr. William C. Foster, Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, representative of the United States of America.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Czechoslovakia, India, Bulgaria, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America and the United Kingdom.

"The co-Chairmen reported on their discussions concerning an agenda for collateral measures, which was followed by a procedural discussion.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 3 March 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.

